Files
Leon SerfatyandClaude Opus 5 3e9ba07175 feat: Cloudflare Turnstile on auth, CSP fixes, admin/SEO/analytics additions
Turnstile bot protection (sign-in, sign-up, password-reset):
- Register Better Auth's captcha plugin with the cloudflare-turnstile
  provider; endpoints listed explicitly rather than relying on defaults.
  /reset-password is intentionally excluded — it is reached only via a
  single-use emailed token.
- Add an explicit-render Turnstile widget component. Tokens are single-use,
  so each form resets the challenge after a failed submit; submit stays
  disabled until a token is held.
- Read the site key server-side and pass it down as a prop, so rotating it
  does not require a rebuild.
- Fail fast in production when TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is missing, and when a
  secret is set without a site key (that combination would demand a token
  no form can produce, locking every user out).
- Pass a throwaway secret during `next build` in the Dockerfile, mirroring
  the existing BETTER_AUTH_SECRET treatment, so image builds don't need it.

CSP fixes in middleware (these blocked Turnstile entirely):
- Add frame-src for challenges.cloudflare.com. Without it the widget's
  iframe fell back to default-src 'self' and was blocked outright.
- Allow 'unsafe-eval' and websockets in DEVELOPMENT only. `next dev`
  compiles with eval(), so the strict policy threw EvalError and killed
  hydration — no client JS ran at all, which also meant form submit
  handlers never fired. Production policy is unchanged and still strict.

Also included (concurrent work in the tree):
- Admin organizations pages and lib/admin/orgs.
- Episode moderation migration, SEO metadata (sitemap, robots, JSON-LD,
  OG/Twitter images, manifest), Umami analytics, not-found page.

Local dev database: docker-compose.dev.yml provisions Postgres 18 on port
5443 (5432-5442 are in use by other local projects).

Note: `npx tsc --noEmit` currently fails in app/(app)/team/page.tsx — an
`invitations` prop the component does not accept. This predates the commit
and will fail `next build` until fixed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 11:10:55 -04:00

87 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import { verifyPaypalWebhook } from "@/lib/billing/paypal";
import { handlePaypalEvent } from "@/lib/billing/webhooks/paypal";
import { alreadyProcessed, logWebhook } from "@/lib/billing/webhook-log";
import { rateLimit, LIMITS } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
/** Best-effort client IP for anonymous rate limiting. */
function clientKey(req: NextRequest): string {
const fwd = req.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
if (fwd) return fwd.split(",")[0].trim();
return req.headers.get("x-real-ip") ?? "anon";
}
// PayPal webhook bodies are small; anything larger is not a real event.
const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1_000_000;
const SIG_HEADERS = [
"paypal-auth-algo",
"paypal-cert-url",
"paypal-transmission-id",
"paypal-transmission-sig",
"paypal-transmission-time",
];
export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
// This endpoint is unauthenticated and verification is done by CALLING PayPal,
// so every request costs us an outbound API call. Throttle per IP, and reject
// obviously-bogus requests before spending anything.
const rl = await rateLimit("paypal-webhook", clientKey(req), LIMITS.webhook);
if (!rl.ok) {
return new Response("Too many requests", {
status: 429,
headers: { "Retry-After": String(rl.retryAfterSec ?? 60) },
});
}
const headers: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
for (const h of SIG_HEADERS) headers[h] = req.headers.get(h) ?? undefined;
// A genuine PayPal delivery always carries all five signature headers. Bailing
// here costs nothing, whereas verifyPaypalWebhook() would hit the network.
if (SIG_HEADERS.some((h) => !headers[h])) {
return new Response("Invalid signature", { status: 400 });
}
// Check the declared size BEFORE reading, so an oversized body is never
// materialized in memory. The post-read check still backstops a missing or
// lying Content-Length.
const declared = Number(req.headers.get("content-length") ?? "0");
if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
return new Response("Payload too large", { status: 413 });
}
const body = await req.text();
if (body.length > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
return new Response("Payload too large", { status: 413 });
}
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(body);
} catch {
return new Response("Invalid payload", { status: 400 });
}
const verified = await verifyPaypalWebhook(headers, body).catch(() => false);
if (!verified) {
console.error("[paypal webhook] verification failed");
return new Response("Invalid signature", { status: 400 });
}
const event = parsed as { id?: string; event_type?: string };
const eventId = event.id ?? `paypal_${Date.now()}`;
if (event.id && (await alreadyProcessed(eventId))) return new Response("ok (duplicate)");
try {
await handlePaypalEvent(event as Parameters<typeof handlePaypalEvent>[0]);
await logWebhook("paypal", eventId, event.event_type ?? "unknown", "processed");
} catch (err) {
console.error("[paypal webhook] handler error", err);
await logWebhook("paypal", eventId, event.event_type ?? "unknown", "failed", err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
return new Response("Handler error", { status: 500 });
}
return new Response("ok");
}