Turnstile bot protection (sign-in, sign-up, password-reset): - Register Better Auth's captcha plugin with the cloudflare-turnstile provider; endpoints listed explicitly rather than relying on defaults. /reset-password is intentionally excluded — it is reached only via a single-use emailed token. - Add an explicit-render Turnstile widget component. Tokens are single-use, so each form resets the challenge after a failed submit; submit stays disabled until a token is held. - Read the site key server-side and pass it down as a prop, so rotating it does not require a rebuild. - Fail fast in production when TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is missing, and when a secret is set without a site key (that combination would demand a token no form can produce, locking every user out). - Pass a throwaway secret during `next build` in the Dockerfile, mirroring the existing BETTER_AUTH_SECRET treatment, so image builds don't need it. CSP fixes in middleware (these blocked Turnstile entirely): - Add frame-src for challenges.cloudflare.com. Without it the widget's iframe fell back to default-src 'self' and was blocked outright. - Allow 'unsafe-eval' and websockets in DEVELOPMENT only. `next dev` compiles with eval(), so the strict policy threw EvalError and killed hydration — no client JS ran at all, which also meant form submit handlers never fired. Production policy is unchanged and still strict. Also included (concurrent work in the tree): - Admin organizations pages and lib/admin/orgs. - Episode moderation migration, SEO metadata (sitemap, robots, JSON-LD, OG/Twitter images, manifest), Umami analytics, not-found page. Local dev database: docker-compose.dev.yml provisions Postgres 18 on port 5443 (5432-5442 are in use by other local projects). Note: `npx tsc --noEmit` currently fails in app/(app)/team/page.tsx — an `invitations` prop the component does not accept. This predates the commit and will fail `next build` until fixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
87 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
87 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { verifyPaypalWebhook } from "@/lib/billing/paypal";
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import { handlePaypalEvent } from "@/lib/billing/webhooks/paypal";
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import { alreadyProcessed, logWebhook } from "@/lib/billing/webhook-log";
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import { rateLimit, LIMITS } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
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export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
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/** Best-effort client IP for anonymous rate limiting. */
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function clientKey(req: NextRequest): string {
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const fwd = req.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
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if (fwd) return fwd.split(",")[0].trim();
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return req.headers.get("x-real-ip") ?? "anon";
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}
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// PayPal webhook bodies are small; anything larger is not a real event.
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const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1_000_000;
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const SIG_HEADERS = [
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"paypal-auth-algo",
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"paypal-cert-url",
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"paypal-transmission-id",
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"paypal-transmission-sig",
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"paypal-transmission-time",
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];
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export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
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// This endpoint is unauthenticated and verification is done by CALLING PayPal,
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// so every request costs us an outbound API call. Throttle per IP, and reject
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// obviously-bogus requests before spending anything.
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const rl = await rateLimit("paypal-webhook", clientKey(req), LIMITS.webhook);
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if (!rl.ok) {
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return new Response("Too many requests", {
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status: 429,
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headers: { "Retry-After": String(rl.retryAfterSec ?? 60) },
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});
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}
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const headers: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
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for (const h of SIG_HEADERS) headers[h] = req.headers.get(h) ?? undefined;
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// A genuine PayPal delivery always carries all five signature headers. Bailing
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// here costs nothing, whereas verifyPaypalWebhook() would hit the network.
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if (SIG_HEADERS.some((h) => !headers[h])) {
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return new Response("Invalid signature", { status: 400 });
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}
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// Check the declared size BEFORE reading, so an oversized body is never
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// materialized in memory. The post-read check still backstops a missing or
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// lying Content-Length.
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const declared = Number(req.headers.get("content-length") ?? "0");
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if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
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return new Response("Payload too large", { status: 413 });
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}
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const body = await req.text();
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if (body.length > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
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return new Response("Payload too large", { status: 413 });
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}
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let parsed: unknown;
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try {
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parsed = JSON.parse(body);
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} catch {
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return new Response("Invalid payload", { status: 400 });
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}
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const verified = await verifyPaypalWebhook(headers, body).catch(() => false);
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if (!verified) {
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console.error("[paypal webhook] verification failed");
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return new Response("Invalid signature", { status: 400 });
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}
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const event = parsed as { id?: string; event_type?: string };
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const eventId = event.id ?? `paypal_${Date.now()}`;
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if (event.id && (await alreadyProcessed(eventId))) return new Response("ok (duplicate)");
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try {
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await handlePaypalEvent(event as Parameters<typeof handlePaypalEvent>[0]);
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await logWebhook("paypal", eventId, event.event_type ?? "unknown", "processed");
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} catch (err) {
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console.error("[paypal webhook] handler error", err);
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await logWebhook("paypal", eventId, event.event_type ?? "unknown", "failed", err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
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return new Response("Handler error", { status: 500 });
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}
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return new Response("ok");
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}
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