Turnstile bot protection (sign-in, sign-up, password-reset): - Register Better Auth's captcha plugin with the cloudflare-turnstile provider; endpoints listed explicitly rather than relying on defaults. /reset-password is intentionally excluded — it is reached only via a single-use emailed token. - Add an explicit-render Turnstile widget component. Tokens are single-use, so each form resets the challenge after a failed submit; submit stays disabled until a token is held. - Read the site key server-side and pass it down as a prop, so rotating it does not require a rebuild. - Fail fast in production when TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is missing, and when a secret is set without a site key (that combination would demand a token no form can produce, locking every user out). - Pass a throwaway secret during `next build` in the Dockerfile, mirroring the existing BETTER_AUTH_SECRET treatment, so image builds don't need it. CSP fixes in middleware (these blocked Turnstile entirely): - Add frame-src for challenges.cloudflare.com. Without it the widget's iframe fell back to default-src 'self' and was blocked outright. - Allow 'unsafe-eval' and websockets in DEVELOPMENT only. `next dev` compiles with eval(), so the strict policy threw EvalError and killed hydration — no client JS ran at all, which also meant form submit handlers never fired. Production policy is unchanged and still strict. Also included (concurrent work in the tree): - Admin organizations pages and lib/admin/orgs. - Episode moderation migration, SEO metadata (sitemap, robots, JSON-LD, OG/Twitter images, manifest), Umami analytics, not-found page. Local dev database: docker-compose.dev.yml provisions Postgres 18 on port 5443 (5432-5442 are in use by other local projects). Note: `npx tsc --noEmit` currently fails in app/(app)/team/page.tsx — an `invitations` prop the component does not accept. This predates the commit and will fail `next build` until fixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
123 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
123 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Umami (self-hosted) analytics configuration and payload redaction.
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*
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* Two deliberate choices are encoded here:
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*
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* 1. The tracker is served same-origin through a rewrite (see `ANALYTICS_PROXY_PATH`
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* and next.config.mjs) rather than from the Umami host directly. That keeps the
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* strict CSP in middleware.ts untouched — `script-src`/`connect-src` stay
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* `'self'` — and stops content blockers from dropping the request.
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*
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* 2. Nothing that identifies a user's content ever reaches the analytics database.
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* See `redactUrl` / `redactTitle`.
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*/
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/** Same-origin prefix the tracker and its beacon are proxied through. */
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export const ANALYTICS_PROXY_PATH = "/_a";
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export interface UmamiConfig {
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/** Origin of the Umami instance, e.g. "https://analytics.example.com". */
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hostUrl: string;
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websiteId: string;
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}
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/**
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* Resolve the Umami config from the environment. Returns null when either value
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* is absent, which disables analytics entirely (the default in development).
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*
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* Both are read at build time for statically rendered pages, so they must be
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* present as build args in Docker — see the Dockerfile.
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*/
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export function umamiConfig(): UmamiConfig | null {
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const hostUrl = process.env.UMAMI_HOST_URL?.trim().replace(/\/+$/, "");
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const websiteId = process.env.UMAMI_WEBSITE_ID?.trim();
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if (!hostUrl || !websiteId) return null;
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return { hostUrl, websiteId };
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}
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/**
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* Path segments that are opaque identifiers rather than page names.
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*
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* Sending them would put episode IDs, series IDs and — worst — unlisted share
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* IDs into the analytics database. Share links are secret by design, so leaking
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* one there effectively publishes it. Collapsing them also makes the reports
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* useful: one "/episodes/[id]" row instead of thousands of singletons.
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*/
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export function redactPath(pathname: string): string {
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const seg = pathname.split("/").filter(Boolean);
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// "/episodes/new" is a real page; "/episodes/<cuid>" is not.
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if (seg[0] === "episodes" && seg[1] && seg[1] !== "new") seg[1] = "[id]";
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else if (seg[0] === "series" && seg[1]) seg[1] = "[id]";
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else if (seg[0] === "p" && seg[1]) seg[1] = "[shareId]";
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else if (seg[0] === "admin" && seg[1] === "users" && seg[2]) seg[2] = "[id]";
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return `/${seg.join("/")}`;
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}
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/**
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* Redact a full URL: collapse identifier segments and drop the query string and
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* hash outright.
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*
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* The query string is the sharper hazard — /reset-password carries a live
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* password-reset token in `?token=`, and /sign-in carries the visitor's intended
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* destination in `?redirect=`. `data-exclude-search` already strips it; this is
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* the second line of defence, and it also covers the referrer field, which the
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* tracker fills from the previous URL.
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*/
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export function redactUrl(raw: string): string {
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if (!raw) return raw;
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try {
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// Bare paths are the common case; the base only matters for absolute URLs.
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const url = new URL(raw, "http://localhost");
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const path = redactPath(url.pathname);
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return url.origin === "http://localhost" && !raw.startsWith("http")
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? path
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: `${url.origin}${path}`;
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} catch {
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// Unparseable — return just the redacted path portion, never the raw value.
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return redactPath(raw.split(/[?#]/)[0]);
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}
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}
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/** Whether a path carries user content that its <title> would expose. */
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function isRedacted(pathname: string): boolean {
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return redactPath(pathname) !== pathname;
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}
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/**
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* Page titles on detail routes are the user's own content — `generateMetadata`
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* returns the episode or series title verbatim. Swap those for the route name so
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* the reports stay readable without storing anyone's content.
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*/
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export function redactTitle(title: string, url: string): string {
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let pathname: string;
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try {
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pathname = new URL(url, "http://localhost").pathname;
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} catch {
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pathname = url.split(/[?#]/)[0];
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}
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return isRedacted(pathname) ? `${redactPath(pathname)} · Podcast Distribution AI` : title;
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}
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/** The Umami event payload we are allowed to inspect and rewrite. */
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export interface UmamiPayload {
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url?: string;
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referrer?: string;
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title?: string;
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[key: string]: unknown;
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}
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/** Apply every redaction rule to one outgoing event payload. */
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export function redactPayload(payload: UmamiPayload): UmamiPayload {
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const url = payload.url ? redactUrl(payload.url) : payload.url;
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return {
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...payload,
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...(url !== undefined ? { url } : {}),
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...(payload.referrer ? { referrer: redactUrl(payload.referrer) } : {}),
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...(payload.title && payload.url
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? { title: redactTitle(payload.title, payload.url) }
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: {}),
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};
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}
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