Files
podcastdistributiona/app/(app)/team/actions.ts
T
Leon SerfatyandClaude Opus 5 3e9ba07175 feat: Cloudflare Turnstile on auth, CSP fixes, admin/SEO/analytics additions
Turnstile bot protection (sign-in, sign-up, password-reset):
- Register Better Auth's captcha plugin with the cloudflare-turnstile
  provider; endpoints listed explicitly rather than relying on defaults.
  /reset-password is intentionally excluded — it is reached only via a
  single-use emailed token.
- Add an explicit-render Turnstile widget component. Tokens are single-use,
  so each form resets the challenge after a failed submit; submit stays
  disabled until a token is held.
- Read the site key server-side and pass it down as a prop, so rotating it
  does not require a rebuild.
- Fail fast in production when TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is missing, and when a
  secret is set without a site key (that combination would demand a token
  no form can produce, locking every user out).
- Pass a throwaway secret during `next build` in the Dockerfile, mirroring
  the existing BETTER_AUTH_SECRET treatment, so image builds don't need it.

CSP fixes in middleware (these blocked Turnstile entirely):
- Add frame-src for challenges.cloudflare.com. Without it the widget's
  iframe fell back to default-src 'self' and was blocked outright.
- Allow 'unsafe-eval' and websockets in DEVELOPMENT only. `next dev`
  compiles with eval(), so the strict policy threw EvalError and killed
  hydration — no client JS ran at all, which also meant form submit
  handlers never fired. Production policy is unchanged and still strict.

Also included (concurrent work in the tree):
- Admin organizations pages and lib/admin/orgs.
- Episode moderation migration, SEO metadata (sitemap, robots, JSON-LD,
  OG/Twitter images, manifest), Umami analytics, not-found page.

Local dev database: docker-compose.dev.yml provisions Postgres 18 on port
5443 (5432-5442 are in use by other local projects).

Note: `npx tsc --noEmit` currently fails in app/(app)/team/page.tsx — an
`invitations` prop the component does not accept. This predates the commit
and will fail `next build` until fixed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 11:10:55 -04:00

230 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript

"use server";
import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache";
import { headers } from "next/headers";
import { z } from "zod";
import { auth } from "@/lib/auth/auth";
import { getServerSession } from "@/lib/auth/guards";
import { getEffectivePlan } from "@/lib/billing/subscription";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
/** http(s)-only URL guard: rejects javascript:/data: and other schemes. */
const httpUrl = z
.string()
.url()
.refine(
(v) => {
try {
const proto = new URL(v).protocol;
return proto === "http:" || proto === "https:";
} catch {
return false;
}
},
{ message: "Logo URL must be an http(s) URL." }
);
const brandingSchema = z.object({
brandName: z.string().max(60).optional(),
primaryColor: z
.string()
.regex(/^#([0-9a-fA-F]{6})$/, "Use a hex colour like #7c3aed")
.optional()
.or(z.literal("")),
logoUrl: httpUrl.optional().or(z.literal("")),
removePoweredBy: z.boolean().optional(),
});
const inviteSchema = z.object({
email: z.string().email("Enter a valid email address."),
});
/**
* Invite a member — the server is the authority on the seat check.
*
* Better Auth only enforces `membershipLimit: 5` (see lib/auth/auth.ts), which is
* NOT the same as the plan's `seats`. So we enforce the plan seat count here before
* delegating to Better Auth's server API (`auth.api.createInvitation`), which itself
* re-verifies that the caller is allowed to invite. The client-side check in
* team-client.tsx remains only as a fast UX guard.
*/
export async function inviteMemberAction(
organizationId: string,
email: string
): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
const session = await getServerSession();
if (!session) return { ok: false, error: "You must be signed in." };
const parsed = inviteSchema.safeParse({ email });
if (!parsed.success) return { ok: false, error: parsed.error.issues[0]?.message ?? "Invalid email." };
// Caller must be an owner/admin of this organization.
const member = await prisma.member.findFirst({
where: { organizationId, userId: session.user.id },
select: { role: true },
});
if (!member || !["owner", "admin"].includes(member.role)) {
return { ok: false, error: "Only workspace owners can invite members." };
}
// Seat enforcement against the effective plan, counting members + pending invites.
const { plan } = await getEffectivePlan(session.user.id, organizationId);
const [memberCount, pendingInvites] = await Promise.all([
prisma.member.count({ where: { organizationId } }),
prisma.invitation.count({ where: { organizationId, status: "pending" } }),
]);
if (memberCount + pendingInvites >= plan.limits.seats) {
return { ok: false, error: `Your plan includes ${plan.limits.seats} seats.` };
}
// Server-side invite via Better Auth's organization plugin API. Passing the
// request headers authenticates the call; Better Auth also re-checks permissions.
try {
await auth.api.createInvitation({
body: { email: parsed.data.email, role: "member", organizationId },
headers: await headers(),
});
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Could not send invitation.";
return { ok: false, error: message };
}
revalidatePath("/team");
return { ok: true };
}
/**
* Shared authorization for every workspace mutation: the caller must be an
* owner/admin of THIS organization. Returns the caller's role, or an error.
*/
async function requireOrgAdmin(
organizationId: string
): Promise<{ ok: true; userId: string; role: string } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
const session = await getServerSession();
if (!session) return { ok: false, error: "You must be signed in." };
const member = await prisma.member.findFirst({
where: { organizationId, userId: session.user.id },
select: { role: true },
});
if (!member || !["owner", "admin"].includes(member.role)) {
return { ok: false, error: "Only workspace owners can manage members." };
}
return { ok: true, userId: session.user.id, role: member.role };
}
/**
* Remove a member, freeing their seat.
*
* Guards: only owner/admin may remove; nobody may remove themselves (that would
* orphan the workspace from the UI); and the last remaining owner is protected,
* otherwise a workspace can be left with no one able to administer it.
*/
export async function removeMemberAction(
organizationId: string,
memberId: string
): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
const auth = await requireOrgAdmin(organizationId);
if (!auth.ok) return { ok: false, error: auth.error };
const target = await prisma.member.findFirst({
where: { id: memberId, organizationId },
select: { id: true, userId: true, role: true },
});
if (!target) return { ok: false, error: "Member not found." };
if (target.userId === auth.userId) {
return { ok: false, error: "You can't remove yourself from the workspace." };
}
if (target.role === "owner") {
const owners = await prisma.member.count({ where: { organizationId, role: "owner" } });
if (owners <= 1) return { ok: false, error: "The workspace must keep at least one owner." };
}
await prisma.member.delete({ where: { id: target.id } });
revalidatePath("/team");
return { ok: true };
}
/** Change a member's workspace role. Same last-owner protection as removal. */
export async function updateMemberRoleAction(
organizationId: string,
memberId: string,
role: "owner" | "admin" | "member"
): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
const auth = await requireOrgAdmin(organizationId);
if (!auth.ok) return { ok: false, error: auth.error };
// `role` is client-supplied and only TS-typed — validate it at runtime.
const parsedRole = z.enum(["owner", "admin", "member"]).safeParse(role);
if (!parsedRole.success) return { ok: false, error: "Invalid role." };
const target = await prisma.member.findFirst({
where: { id: memberId, organizationId },
select: { id: true, userId: true, role: true },
});
if (!target) return { ok: false, error: "Member not found." };
if (target.role === "owner" && parsedRole.data !== "owner") {
const owners = await prisma.member.count({ where: { organizationId, role: "owner" } });
if (owners <= 1) return { ok: false, error: "The workspace must keep at least one owner." };
}
await prisma.member.update({ where: { id: target.id }, data: { role: parsedRole.data } });
revalidatePath("/team");
return { ok: true };
}
/**
* Revoke a pending invitation, freeing the seat it was holding.
* Scoped to the organization so an id from another workspace can't be cancelled.
*/
export async function revokeInvitationAction(
organizationId: string,
invitationId: string
): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
const auth = await requireOrgAdmin(organizationId);
if (!auth.ok) return { ok: false, error: auth.error };
const invite = await prisma.invitation.findFirst({
where: { id: invitationId, organizationId, status: "pending" },
select: { id: true },
});
if (!invite) return { ok: false, error: "Invitation not found." };
await prisma.invitation.update({ where: { id: invite.id }, data: { status: "canceled" } });
revalidatePath("/team");
return { ok: true };
}
export async function saveBrandingAction(
organizationId: string,
data: z.infer<typeof brandingSchema>
): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
const session = await getServerSession();
if (!session) return { ok: false, error: "You must be signed in." };
const member = await prisma.member.findFirst({
where: { organizationId, userId: session.user.id },
select: { role: true },
});
if (!member || !["owner", "admin"].includes(member.role)) {
return { ok: false, error: "Only workspace owners can edit branding." };
}
const parsed = brandingSchema.safeParse(data);
if (!parsed.success) return { ok: false, error: parsed.error.issues[0]?.message ?? "Invalid input." };
const payload = {
brandName: parsed.data.brandName || null,
primaryColor: parsed.data.primaryColor || null,
logoUrl: parsed.data.logoUrl || null,
removePoweredBy: parsed.data.removePoweredBy ?? false,
};
await prisma.orgBranding.upsert({
where: { organizationId },
create: { organizationId, ...payload },
update: payload,
});
revalidatePath("/team");
return { ok: true };
}