Turnstile bot protection (sign-in, sign-up, password-reset): - Register Better Auth's captcha plugin with the cloudflare-turnstile provider; endpoints listed explicitly rather than relying on defaults. /reset-password is intentionally excluded — it is reached only via a single-use emailed token. - Add an explicit-render Turnstile widget component. Tokens are single-use, so each form resets the challenge after a failed submit; submit stays disabled until a token is held. - Read the site key server-side and pass it down as a prop, so rotating it does not require a rebuild. - Fail fast in production when TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is missing, and when a secret is set without a site key (that combination would demand a token no form can produce, locking every user out). - Pass a throwaway secret during `next build` in the Dockerfile, mirroring the existing BETTER_AUTH_SECRET treatment, so image builds don't need it. CSP fixes in middleware (these blocked Turnstile entirely): - Add frame-src for challenges.cloudflare.com. Without it the widget's iframe fell back to default-src 'self' and was blocked outright. - Allow 'unsafe-eval' and websockets in DEVELOPMENT only. `next dev` compiles with eval(), so the strict policy threw EvalError and killed hydration — no client JS ran at all, which also meant form submit handlers never fired. Production policy is unchanged and still strict. Also included (concurrent work in the tree): - Admin organizations pages and lib/admin/orgs. - Episode moderation migration, SEO metadata (sitemap, robots, JSON-LD, OG/Twitter images, manifest), Umami analytics, not-found page. Local dev database: docker-compose.dev.yml provisions Postgres 18 on port 5443 (5432-5442 are in use by other local projects). Note: `npx tsc --noEmit` currently fails in app/(app)/team/page.tsx — an `invitations` prop the component does not accept. This predates the commit and will fail `next build` until fixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
24 lines
896 B
TypeScript
24 lines
896 B
TypeScript
/**
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* Renders a JSON-LD structured-data block.
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*
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* No CSP nonce is applied — deliberately. `application/ld+json` is a data block,
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* not an executable script: browsers bail out of script preparation before the
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* `script-src` check runs, so the strict nonce policy set in middleware.ts never
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* blocks it. Threading a nonce through would require reading `headers()`, which
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* would opt every marketing page out of static rendering for no benefit.
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*
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* The payload is serialized with `<` escaped so a value containing "</script>"
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* cannot break out of the block.
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*/
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export function JsonLd({ data }: { data: Record<string, unknown> | Record<string, unknown>[] }) {
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return (
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<script
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type="application/ld+json"
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// eslint-disable-next-line react/no-danger
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dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{
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__html: JSON.stringify(data).replace(/</g, "\\u003c"),
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}}
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/>
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);
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}
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