serfowiandClaude Opus 5
c617bc9687
Acts on an adversarial review of the M1 auth and authorization code. Five findings fixed; the rest recorded in SECURITY-FINDINGS.md as the M1 exit criteria rather than left in a tool transcript. - auth: serve /phone-number/request-password-reset, /phone-number/ reset-password and /sign-in/phone-number as 404. better-auth's phoneNumber() registers all three unconditionally -- they are NOT gated on emailAndPassword.enabled:false. Left live they form a silent second credential path: request-password-reset stores an OTP and sends no SMS (sendPasswordResetOTP was never configured, so the owner is never told), reset-password mints a bcrypt credential row, and sign-in/phone-number then accepts it forever with no OTP. The OTP gate still applies, so this is not remote unauthenticated takeover -- it converts one momentary OTP compromise into permanent access the victim cannot see or rotate. - auth: drop bearer(). It accepts the plaintext sessions.token column as an Authorization credential, making any single leaked row a replayable login. The mobile client it was added for is hypothetical. - auth: pin E.164 via phoneNumberValidator, and add toE164/isE164 to @linkder/shared. phone is UNIQUE and bans are per-account, so "+34600111222" and "0034600111222" being separately storable meant one handset could hold two accounts and a ban was escapable by retyping. 15 tests. - auth: NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL now throws in production instead of falling back to localhost, which was silently dropping Secure and the __Secure- prefix from the production session cookie. - pro.upsertProfile: actually apply requiresReReview. It was computed, returned to the client and never acted on, so a verified plumber could become a verified electrician in another city by ignoring a response flag. Now demotes to pending in the same transaction and audits it. Trade changes count as material (they did not before) -- the licence is per-trade. Needed a verified -> pending edge in VERIFICATION_GRAPH, which did not exist. Removed two untracked scratch repro files. The impersonation repro depended on bearer() for transport and no longer applies as written; the underlying finding (resolveSession drops impersonatedBy, so admin actions are audited as the victim) is open and documented. typecheck, lint, build clean; 127 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
77 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
77 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
# Open security findings (M1 auth review)
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An adversarial review of the M1 auth, session and authorization code produced 28
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confirmed findings (~20 after deduplication). The ones **fixed** are listed first
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so nobody re-reports them; the rest are open and are the M1 exit criteria.
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## Fixed
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| # | Issue | Fix |
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| 1 | `pro.upsertProfile` computed `requiresReReview` and never applied it — a verified plumber could silently become a verified electrician 40 km away | Demotes a `verified` profile to `pending` in the same transaction, writes an audit row, and now counts a **trade change** as material (it did not before). Needed a new `verified -> pending` edge in `VERIFICATION_GRAPH` |
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| 2 | `phoneNumber()` registers `/phone-number/request-password-reset`, `/phone-number/reset-password` and `/sign-in/phone-number` **unconditionally** — not gated on `emailAndPassword.enabled: false`. Together they mint a password credential with no SMS sent to the owner, then accept it forever with no OTP | All three served as 404 via `disabledPaths` (checked in `onRequest`, before rate limiting) |
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| 3 | `bearer()` accepted the raw plaintext `sessions.token` column as an `Authorization: Bearer` credential — one leaked DB row is a replayable login | Plugin removed. The mobile client it was for does not exist yet |
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| 4 | Phone numbers stored exactly as typed, so `+34600111222` and `0034600111222` are two "unique" accounts — defeating the UNIQUE constraint, bans, and duplicate detection | `phoneNumberValidator` pins E.164 on send-otp and sign-in; `toE164`/`isE164` added to `@linkder/shared` |
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| 5 | `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` fell back to `http://localhost:3000`, which drops `Secure` and the `__Secure-` prefix from the production session cookie | Throws at boot in production |
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## Open — must close before M1 ships
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**Authorization / attribution**
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- `resolveSession` discards `session.impersonatedBy`, so every admin action taken
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while impersonating is written to `audit_log` as the **victim**. The `Session`
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type has no field for it, so no procedure can tell. Admin impersonation is
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enabled (`admin()` plugin) and is currently invisible to the application.
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*Fix:* add `impersonatedBy` to `Session`, populate it in `resolveSession`, and
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record it on all three `audit_log` insert sites.
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- `user.setRole` is a check-then-write across two connections; a concurrent
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`job.create` permanently strands the job it was meant to protect.
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- `deck.swipe` checks `job.status` outside its transaction — a concurrent
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`job.cancel` loses the race and a pending request lands on a cancelled job.
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- `deck.undo`'s "already reached the pro" guard is check-then-write: it deletes
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the tombstone for a request that really was sent, and reports success.
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**Storage / uploads**
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- Government ID and insurance scans go to the **public** bucket;
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`isPrivateKind` is never called from production code.
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- Presigned PUT does not pin `Content-Type`, so a caller can store HTML under an
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image key in a public bucket.
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- `pro.addMedia`, `pro.addCredential` and `job.create` accept **any** URL the
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caller sends, with no binding to an object that caller actually uploaded —
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which bypasses the presign design entirely.
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**Abuse / spend**
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- No per-number cap, destination allowlist, or global ceiling on
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`/phone-number/send-otp`. SMS spend is unmetered.
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- better-auth rate limiting is per-process in-memory and collapses to one global
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bucket behind a proxy chain — 10 req/min then locks out the whole platform.
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Needs the Redis-backed `rateLimit.customStorage`, not `secondary-storage`
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(which throws unless all five `SecondaryStorage` methods exist).
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**Lower severity**
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- `user.setEmail` lets any authenticated user claim an arbitrary *unverified*
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address, locking the real owner out of Google sign-up and leaking which
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addresses are registered.
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- Open redirect: the `next` query param on the sign-in form goes straight to
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`router.push`.
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- `audit_log.ip` trusts the leftmost `X-Forwarded-For` entry verbatim —
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attacker-controlled.
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- `findPossibleDuplicates` has no call site; the guarantee it was written to
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provide never executes.
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- `DeckClient` renders a frozen `initialCards` prop and invalidates a query
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nothing subscribes to, capping the deck at 20 cards per page load.
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- A right swipe after a left swipe creates a live request while the stored swipe
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row still records a rejection.
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## Note on the OTP-in-plaintext decision
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`apps/web/src/lib/auth.ts` argues the plaintext OTP is acceptable partly because
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"anyone who can read that table can already read `session.token`". With
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`bearer()` removed that argument is weaker than when it was written — a session
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token now requires an httpOnly browser cookie to use, an OTP does not. The
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decision still stands (300s window, 3 attempts, rate limited) but revisit it if
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OTP lifetime or attempt budget ever increases.
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