Snapshot of uncommitted work that had accumulated in the tree alongside the Turnstile changes: - marketing pages, SEO helpers (lib/seo.ts, lib/marketing/) and structured data - admin billing actions and a per-user portfolio view, plus an admin error boundary - rate limiting (lib/rate-limit.ts) applied across the /api/v1 surface - CSP and proxy adjustments, accounting/webhook lib updates - Playwright config and an e2e/unit test suite - next bumped to ^16.3.4 with the lockfile regenerated - generated AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md Authored by other sessions working in this tree; committed here so the Turnstile work could be pushed without leaving the tree dirty. Typecheck passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
46 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
46 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from "crypto"
|
|
|
|
// AES-256-GCM encryption for secrets at rest (OAuth tokens). The key is derived
|
|
// from ACCOUNTING_ENCRYPTION_KEY, falling back to BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, via SHA-256
|
|
// so no additional configuration is required.
|
|
let warnedAboutFallbackKey = false
|
|
|
|
function getKey(): Buffer {
|
|
const dedicated = process.env.ACCOUNTING_ENCRYPTION_KEY
|
|
const secret = dedicated || process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET
|
|
if (!secret) throw new Error("No encryption key configured (BETTER_AUTH_SECRET)")
|
|
|
|
// Riding on BETTER_AUTH_SECRET works, but couples two independent rotation
|
|
// schedules: rotating the auth secret would silently make every stored OAuth
|
|
// token undecryptable, with no migration path and no error until a user's
|
|
// next accounting sync fails. Warn once so this is caught before that
|
|
// happens rather than after.
|
|
if (!dedicated && !warnedAboutFallbackKey) {
|
|
warnedAboutFallbackKey = true
|
|
console.warn(
|
|
"[crypto] ACCOUNTING_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set — deriving the at-rest key " +
|
|
"from BETTER_AUTH_SECRET. Rotating BETTER_AUTH_SECRET will make all " +
|
|
"stored OAuth tokens undecryptable. Set a dedicated key in production."
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(secret).digest()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Encrypt a UTF-8 string → "iv:tag:ciphertext" (all base64). */
|
|
export function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {
|
|
const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12)
|
|
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", getKey(), iv)
|
|
const enc = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()])
|
|
const tag = cipher.getAuthTag()
|
|
return [iv.toString("base64"), tag.toString("base64"), enc.toString("base64")].join(":")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Decrypt a value produced by encrypt(). */
|
|
export function decrypt(payload: string): string {
|
|
const [ivB64, tagB64, dataB64] = payload.split(":")
|
|
const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", getKey(), Buffer.from(ivB64, "base64"))
|
|
decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagB64, "base64"))
|
|
return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(Buffer.from(dataB64, "base64")), decipher.final()]).toString("utf8")
|
|
}
|