Turnstile bot protection (sign-in, sign-up, password-reset): - Register Better Auth's captcha plugin with the cloudflare-turnstile provider; endpoints listed explicitly rather than relying on defaults. /reset-password is intentionally excluded — it is reached only via a single-use emailed token. - Add an explicit-render Turnstile widget component. Tokens are single-use, so each form resets the challenge after a failed submit; submit stays disabled until a token is held. - Read the site key server-side and pass it down as a prop, so rotating it does not require a rebuild. - Fail fast in production when TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is missing, and when a secret is set without a site key (that combination would demand a token no form can produce, locking every user out). - Pass a throwaway secret during `next build` in the Dockerfile, mirroring the existing BETTER_AUTH_SECRET treatment, so image builds don't need it. CSP fixes in middleware (these blocked Turnstile entirely): - Add frame-src for challenges.cloudflare.com. Without it the widget's iframe fell back to default-src 'self' and was blocked outright. - Allow 'unsafe-eval' and websockets in DEVELOPMENT only. `next dev` compiles with eval(), so the strict policy threw EvalError and killed hydration — no client JS ran at all, which also meant form submit handlers never fired. Production policy is unchanged and still strict. Also included (concurrent work in the tree): - Admin organizations pages and lib/admin/orgs. - Episode moderation migration, SEO metadata (sitemap, robots, JSON-LD, OG/Twitter images, manifest), Umami analytics, not-found page. Local dev database: docker-compose.dev.yml provisions Postgres 18 on port 5443 (5432-5442 are in use by other local projects). Note: `npx tsc --noEmit` currently fails in app/(app)/team/page.tsx — an `invitations` prop the component does not accept. This predates the commit and will fail `next build` until fixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
230 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
230 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
"use server";
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import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache";
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import { headers } from "next/headers";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import { auth } from "@/lib/auth/auth";
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import { getServerSession } from "@/lib/auth/guards";
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import { getEffectivePlan } from "@/lib/billing/subscription";
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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/** http(s)-only URL guard: rejects javascript:/data: and other schemes. */
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const httpUrl = z
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.string()
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.url()
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.refine(
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(v) => {
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try {
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const proto = new URL(v).protocol;
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return proto === "http:" || proto === "https:";
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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},
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{ message: "Logo URL must be an http(s) URL." }
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);
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const brandingSchema = z.object({
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brandName: z.string().max(60).optional(),
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primaryColor: z
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.string()
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.regex(/^#([0-9a-fA-F]{6})$/, "Use a hex colour like #7c3aed")
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.optional()
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.or(z.literal("")),
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logoUrl: httpUrl.optional().or(z.literal("")),
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removePoweredBy: z.boolean().optional(),
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});
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const inviteSchema = z.object({
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email: z.string().email("Enter a valid email address."),
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});
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/**
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* Invite a member — the server is the authority on the seat check.
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*
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* Better Auth only enforces `membershipLimit: 5` (see lib/auth/auth.ts), which is
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* NOT the same as the plan's `seats`. So we enforce the plan seat count here before
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* delegating to Better Auth's server API (`auth.api.createInvitation`), which itself
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* re-verifies that the caller is allowed to invite. The client-side check in
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* team-client.tsx remains only as a fast UX guard.
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*/
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export async function inviteMemberAction(
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organizationId: string,
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email: string
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): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
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const session = await getServerSession();
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if (!session) return { ok: false, error: "You must be signed in." };
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const parsed = inviteSchema.safeParse({ email });
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if (!parsed.success) return { ok: false, error: parsed.error.issues[0]?.message ?? "Invalid email." };
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// Caller must be an owner/admin of this organization.
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const member = await prisma.member.findFirst({
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where: { organizationId, userId: session.user.id },
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select: { role: true },
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});
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if (!member || !["owner", "admin"].includes(member.role)) {
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return { ok: false, error: "Only workspace owners can invite members." };
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}
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// Seat enforcement against the effective plan, counting members + pending invites.
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const { plan } = await getEffectivePlan(session.user.id, organizationId);
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const [memberCount, pendingInvites] = await Promise.all([
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prisma.member.count({ where: { organizationId } }),
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prisma.invitation.count({ where: { organizationId, status: "pending" } }),
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]);
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if (memberCount + pendingInvites >= plan.limits.seats) {
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return { ok: false, error: `Your plan includes ${plan.limits.seats} seats.` };
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}
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// Server-side invite via Better Auth's organization plugin API. Passing the
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// request headers authenticates the call; Better Auth also re-checks permissions.
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try {
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await auth.api.createInvitation({
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body: { email: parsed.data.email, role: "member", organizationId },
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headers: await headers(),
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});
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} catch (err) {
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const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Could not send invitation.";
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return { ok: false, error: message };
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}
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revalidatePath("/team");
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return { ok: true };
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}
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/**
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* Shared authorization for every workspace mutation: the caller must be an
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* owner/admin of THIS organization. Returns the caller's role, or an error.
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*/
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async function requireOrgAdmin(
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organizationId: string
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): Promise<{ ok: true; userId: string; role: string } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
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const session = await getServerSession();
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if (!session) return { ok: false, error: "You must be signed in." };
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const member = await prisma.member.findFirst({
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where: { organizationId, userId: session.user.id },
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select: { role: true },
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});
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if (!member || !["owner", "admin"].includes(member.role)) {
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return { ok: false, error: "Only workspace owners can manage members." };
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}
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return { ok: true, userId: session.user.id, role: member.role };
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}
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/**
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* Remove a member, freeing their seat.
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*
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* Guards: only owner/admin may remove; nobody may remove themselves (that would
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* orphan the workspace from the UI); and the last remaining owner is protected,
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* otherwise a workspace can be left with no one able to administer it.
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*/
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export async function removeMemberAction(
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organizationId: string,
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memberId: string
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): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
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const auth = await requireOrgAdmin(organizationId);
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if (!auth.ok) return { ok: false, error: auth.error };
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const target = await prisma.member.findFirst({
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where: { id: memberId, organizationId },
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select: { id: true, userId: true, role: true },
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});
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if (!target) return { ok: false, error: "Member not found." };
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if (target.userId === auth.userId) {
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return { ok: false, error: "You can't remove yourself from the workspace." };
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}
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if (target.role === "owner") {
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const owners = await prisma.member.count({ where: { organizationId, role: "owner" } });
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if (owners <= 1) return { ok: false, error: "The workspace must keep at least one owner." };
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}
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await prisma.member.delete({ where: { id: target.id } });
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revalidatePath("/team");
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return { ok: true };
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}
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/** Change a member's workspace role. Same last-owner protection as removal. */
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export async function updateMemberRoleAction(
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organizationId: string,
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memberId: string,
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role: "owner" | "admin" | "member"
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): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
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const auth = await requireOrgAdmin(organizationId);
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if (!auth.ok) return { ok: false, error: auth.error };
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// `role` is client-supplied and only TS-typed — validate it at runtime.
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const parsedRole = z.enum(["owner", "admin", "member"]).safeParse(role);
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if (!parsedRole.success) return { ok: false, error: "Invalid role." };
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const target = await prisma.member.findFirst({
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where: { id: memberId, organizationId },
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select: { id: true, userId: true, role: true },
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});
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if (!target) return { ok: false, error: "Member not found." };
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if (target.role === "owner" && parsedRole.data !== "owner") {
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const owners = await prisma.member.count({ where: { organizationId, role: "owner" } });
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if (owners <= 1) return { ok: false, error: "The workspace must keep at least one owner." };
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}
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await prisma.member.update({ where: { id: target.id }, data: { role: parsedRole.data } });
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revalidatePath("/team");
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return { ok: true };
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}
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/**
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* Revoke a pending invitation, freeing the seat it was holding.
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* Scoped to the organization so an id from another workspace can't be cancelled.
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*/
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export async function revokeInvitationAction(
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organizationId: string,
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invitationId: string
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): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
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const auth = await requireOrgAdmin(organizationId);
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if (!auth.ok) return { ok: false, error: auth.error };
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const invite = await prisma.invitation.findFirst({
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where: { id: invitationId, organizationId, status: "pending" },
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select: { id: true },
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});
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if (!invite) return { ok: false, error: "Invitation not found." };
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await prisma.invitation.update({ where: { id: invite.id }, data: { status: "canceled" } });
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revalidatePath("/team");
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return { ok: true };
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}
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export async function saveBrandingAction(
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organizationId: string,
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data: z.infer<typeof brandingSchema>
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): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
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const session = await getServerSession();
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if (!session) return { ok: false, error: "You must be signed in." };
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const member = await prisma.member.findFirst({
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where: { organizationId, userId: session.user.id },
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select: { role: true },
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});
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if (!member || !["owner", "admin"].includes(member.role)) {
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return { ok: false, error: "Only workspace owners can edit branding." };
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}
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const parsed = brandingSchema.safeParse(data);
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if (!parsed.success) return { ok: false, error: parsed.error.issues[0]?.message ?? "Invalid input." };
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const payload = {
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brandName: parsed.data.brandName || null,
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primaryColor: parsed.data.primaryColor || null,
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logoUrl: parsed.data.logoUrl || null,
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removePoweredBy: parsed.data.removePoweredBy ?? false,
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};
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await prisma.orgBranding.upsert({
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where: { organizationId },
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create: { organizationId, ...payload },
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update: payload,
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});
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revalidatePath("/team");
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return { ok: true };
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}
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