Turnstile bot protection (sign-in, sign-up, password-reset):
- Register Better Auth's captcha plugin with the cloudflare-turnstile
provider; endpoints listed explicitly rather than relying on defaults.
/reset-password is intentionally excluded — it is reached only via a
single-use emailed token.
- Add an explicit-render Turnstile widget component. Tokens are single-use,
so each form resets the challenge after a failed submit; submit stays
disabled until a token is held.
- Read the site key server-side and pass it down as a prop, so rotating it
does not require a rebuild.
- Fail fast in production when TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is missing, and when a
secret is set without a site key (that combination would demand a token
no form can produce, locking every user out).
- Pass a throwaway secret during `next build` in the Dockerfile, mirroring
the existing BETTER_AUTH_SECRET treatment, so image builds don't need it.
CSP fixes in middleware (these blocked Turnstile entirely):
- Add frame-src for challenges.cloudflare.com. Without it the widget's
iframe fell back to default-src 'self' and was blocked outright.
- Allow 'unsafe-eval' and websockets in DEVELOPMENT only. `next dev`
compiles with eval(), so the strict policy threw EvalError and killed
hydration — no client JS ran at all, which also meant form submit
handlers never fired. Production policy is unchanged and still strict.
Also included (concurrent work in the tree):
- Admin organizations pages and lib/admin/orgs.
- Episode moderation migration, SEO metadata (sitemap, robots, JSON-LD,
OG/Twitter images, manifest), Umami analytics, not-found page.
Local dev database: docker-compose.dev.yml provisions Postgres 18 on port
5443 (5432-5442 are in use by other local projects).
Note: `npx tsc --noEmit` currently fails in app/(app)/team/page.tsx — an
`invitations` prop the component does not accept. This predates the commit
and will fail `next build` until fixed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The worker runs worker/index.ts under tsx (plain Node) and transitively
imports lib/flags (and other server-only-guarded modules) via the generation
pipeline. `server-only` resolves to its throwing index.js outside Next's RSC
bundler, crash-looping the worker container. Copy the package's empty.js over
index.js in the final image so the runtime import is a no-op; the build-time
client/server guard already ran during `next build`. Web is unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The security-hardening pass tightened lib/auth/auth.ts to reject secrets
shorter than 32 chars (or known placeholders) in production. next build
evaluates that guard while collecting page data for /api/auth/[...all], so
the old 21-char "build-time-placeholder" now fails the build. Lengthen the
throwaway build-only value to satisfy the guard; the real secret is still
injected at run time and never baked into the image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
