974e3125345a06024968a04cfaeb64969b9c235f
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 serfaandClaude Opus 5
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974e312534 |
M2: the full job lifecycle — chat, hiring, geocoding, quotes, bookings, reviews
Closes the funnel. Before this the product could match two people and then stopped: `quotes`, `bookings` and `reviews` had tables and state machines and nothing that wrote a row, the entry deck's right swipe was wired to an empty handler, and every address resolved to the city centre. Jobs tab and chat - message router: thread, send, markRead, unreadTotal. A thread is a MATCH, not a job — one job with three interested pros is three private conversations. - Current/Past segments derived from ACTIVE_JOB_STATUSES, job detail listing the pros who accepted, and the conversation itself with attachments. Hiring from the deck - A right swipe on the entry deck opened nothing. It now resolves "which job?" through a sheet — sign in, pick an open job, or post one — and calls the same deck.swipe the per-job deck does, so the open-request cap and row lock apply exactly once. Swipes are vetoable so closing the sheet returns the card. Geocoding - ST_Distance and ST_DWithin rank and filter every deck, and both operands were placeholders. Addresses now resolve through Mapbox (permanent=true, which is what licenses storing the coordinates), the server resolves points rather than trusting client-supplied lat/lng, and every stored point records how it was obtained. A `city`-precision base cannot reach the verification queue. Quote -> booking -> review - The commercial chain, minus payments. Accepting a quote is the only place a booking is created; confirming completion is what unlocks reviews and moves the pro's completed_jobs. - Reviews publish double-blind with no sweeper: each is written with published_at already set to its embargo deadline and every read filters published_at <= now(), so it publishes itself. The second review pulls both forward. A silent counterparty cannot bury a bad review by never replying. State machine changes, both deliberate - booked -> matched: a cancelled booking is not a cancelled job. - scheduled -> awaiting_confirmation: in_progress is optional, so a pro who never tapped Start can still say the work is done. Test suite - api tests ran files in parallel against one database and failed roughly one run in three on whichever file lost the race. Serialised, and three fixtures that grabbed "the first client" pinned to the seeded accounts. Also includes work from a parallel session: admin verification queue, pro public profile and reviews read path, notification sending, denormalised stats recompute, search, and observability. 318 tests passing; typecheck and lint clean across 7 packages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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serfowiandClaude Opus 5
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582f13fa99 |
Entry screen is the app: phone frame with a live deck inside
The homepage was a marketing brochure -- a hero paragraph, a "three steps" explainer and a tag list. It described the gesture in prose while the actual Tinder deck sat behind /deck/[jobId], reachable only after signing in AND posting a job. Nobody opening the app ever saw the product. Now / renders a phone illustration with the real app running inside it: the same <Deck>, the same drag physics, real verified pros. On a phone the bezel collapses and the deck simply fills the viewport -- drawing a picture of a phone on a phone is absurd, and it would eat the width the cards need. - Removed the fixed app bar and bottom tab bar. AppShell now renders the screen title as an in-flow h1; the bar owned the only h1 on every screen, so dropping it silently would have left every page headingless. The /jobs "post" action moved from bar chrome into the content, since the tab bar was its only other route there. - getShowcaseDeck(): a deck with no job behind it. getDeck is job-scoped (joins jobs for category and location, anti-joins swipes), which an anonymous visitor has none of, so this centres on the launch city. Eligibility rules are copied verbatim -- nobody may appear in the shop window who could not appear on a real deck. - deck.showcase: the only public procedure in the router. list and swipe stay behind clientProcedure. It reads nothing about the caller and writes nothing, so a right swipe on the entry screen is purely local. No real tradesperson is contacted until a job is posted. - <Deck> filled a hardcoded 560px desktop box; it now fills its container. The card counter moved out from between the two action buttons so the thumb zone holds nothing but the two controls. Verified against the seeded database: 22 eligible pros returned, and all three seeded traps excluded for the right reason -- Pau Ribas (22km out, 5km radius), Unverified Ulla (pending), Away Arnau (not accepting). 7 new integration tests cover exactly that. Also corrects a label I had written as "Plumbers near you" -- the showcase deck is not category-filtered and shows every trade. Includes concurrent edits to the mobile shell, ui/ primitives and DESIGN.md made outside this session. typecheck, lint, build clean; 141 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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serfowiandClaude Opus 5
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c617bc9687 |
M1 security: close the password backdoor, apply re-review, pin E.164
Acts on an adversarial review of the M1 auth and authorization code. Five findings fixed; the rest recorded in SECURITY-FINDINGS.md as the M1 exit criteria rather than left in a tool transcript. - auth: serve /phone-number/request-password-reset, /phone-number/ reset-password and /sign-in/phone-number as 404. better-auth's phoneNumber() registers all three unconditionally -- they are NOT gated on emailAndPassword.enabled:false. Left live they form a silent second credential path: request-password-reset stores an OTP and sends no SMS (sendPasswordResetOTP was never configured, so the owner is never told), reset-password mints a bcrypt credential row, and sign-in/phone-number then accepts it forever with no OTP. The OTP gate still applies, so this is not remote unauthenticated takeover -- it converts one momentary OTP compromise into permanent access the victim cannot see or rotate. - auth: drop bearer(). It accepts the plaintext sessions.token column as an Authorization credential, making any single leaked row a replayable login. The mobile client it was added for is hypothetical. - auth: pin E.164 via phoneNumberValidator, and add toE164/isE164 to @linkder/shared. phone is UNIQUE and bans are per-account, so "+34600111222" and "0034600111222" being separately storable meant one handset could hold two accounts and a ban was escapable by retyping. 15 tests. - auth: NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL now throws in production instead of falling back to localhost, which was silently dropping Secure and the __Secure- prefix from the production session cookie. - pro.upsertProfile: actually apply requiresReReview. It was computed, returned to the client and never acted on, so a verified plumber could become a verified electrician in another city by ignoring a response flag. Now demotes to pending in the same transaction and audits it. Trade changes count as material (they did not before) -- the licence is per-trade. Needed a verified -> pending edge in VERIFICATION_GRAPH, which did not exist. Removed two untracked scratch repro files. The impersonation repro depended on bearer() for transport and no longer applies as written; the underlying finding (resolveSession drops impersonatedBy, so admin actions are audited as the victim) is open and documented. typecheck, lint, build clean; 127 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |