linkder

11 Commits 1 Branch 0 Tags

2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
serfaandClaude Opus 5	974e312534	M2: the full job lifecycle — chat, hiring, geocoding, quotes, bookings, reviews Closes the funnel. Before this the product could match two people and then stopped: `quotes`, `bookings` and `reviews` had tables and state machines and nothing that wrote a row, the entry deck's right swipe was wired to an empty handler, and every address resolved to the city centre. Jobs tab and chat - message router: thread, send, markRead, unreadTotal. A thread is a MATCH, not a job — one job with three interested pros is three private conversations. - Current/Past segments derived from ACTIVE_JOB_STATUSES, job detail listing the pros who accepted, and the conversation itself with attachments. Hiring from the deck - A right swipe on the entry deck opened nothing. It now resolves "which job?" through a sheet — sign in, pick an open job, or post one — and calls the same deck.swipe the per-job deck does, so the open-request cap and row lock apply exactly once. Swipes are vetoable so closing the sheet returns the card. Geocoding - ST_Distance and ST_DWithin rank and filter every deck, and both operands were placeholders. Addresses now resolve through Mapbox (permanent=true, which is what licenses storing the coordinates), the server resolves points rather than trusting client-supplied lat/lng, and every stored point records how it was obtained. A `city`-precision base cannot reach the verification queue. Quote -> booking -> review - The commercial chain, minus payments. Accepting a quote is the only place a booking is created; confirming completion is what unlocks reviews and moves the pro's completed_jobs. - Reviews publish double-blind with no sweeper: each is written with published_at already set to its embargo deadline and every read filters published_at <= now(), so it publishes itself. The second review pulls both forward. A silent counterparty cannot bury a bad review by never replying. State machine changes, both deliberate - booked -> matched: a cancelled booking is not a cancelled job. - scheduled -> awaiting_confirmation: in_progress is optional, so a pro who never tapped Start can still say the work is done. Test suite - api tests ran files in parallel against one database and failed roughly one run in three on whichever file lost the race. Serialised, and three fixtures that grabbed "the first client" pinned to the seeded accounts. Also includes work from a parallel session: admin verification queue, pro public profile and reviews read path, notification sending, denormalised stats recompute, search, and observability. 318 tests passing; typecheck and lint clean across 7 packages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-21 06:29:59 -04:00
serfowiandClaude Opus 5	cebeda7f4c	M1: authentication with better-auth, verified end to end Switches from the planned Auth.js v5 to better-auth 1.7.1. The plan assumed the blocker would be schema fit; it is not. @auth/drizzle-adapter accepts our tables verbatim. What rules Auth.js out is that credentials providers hardcode JWT and never call adapter.createSession, and the config assertion that would catch it only fires when EVERY provider is credentials — so adding Google suppresses the warning and the app ships silently broken. Phone OTP with database sessions is not reachable there without hand-building the whole OTP security layer. Also corrects a premise: better-auth's drizzle-orm peer is declared OPTIONAL, so no 0.38 -> 0.45 upgrade is forced. Verified on 0.38.4. - auth schema rewritten to better-auth 1.7.1's own getSchema() output: sessions/accounts/verifications reshaped, emailVerified and phoneVerified are BOOLEAN (a timestamptz there fails 100% of signups), accounts.issuer added, phone_otps dropped. Ban state now comes from the admin plugin rather than a second bannedAt column. - Session resolution is one file. Everything downstream is written against our own Session type, so the provider stays swappable. - Ban enforcement lives in the resolver because Session carries no ban field and protectedProcedure promises a non-banned user. - Phone OTP sign-in, Google, role selection, tRPC user router. - Synthetic emails for phone-first users, with isSyntheticEmail() gating every future send. Pros must supply a real address; clients need not. - Duplicate-account detection, since both signup routes stay open and nothing correlates a phone to a Google identity. Detects only — merging accounts that carry reviews and payments needs its own tooling. - SMS sender refuses to fall back to console logging in production. - declaration:false for the app, which is the actual fix for the TS2742 wall from better-auth's transitive zod under pnpm. Verified against a live server: OTP sent, code verified, uuid PK honoured, database session written, and an authenticated tRPC call resolved. A signed-in stranger gets NOT_FOUND on another client's deck; anonymous gets UNAUTHORIZED. 124 tests passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-20 14:40:23 -04:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

serfaandClaude Opus 5

974e312534

M2: the full job lifecycle — chat, hiring, geocoding, quotes, bookings, reviews

Closes the funnel. Before this the product could match two people and then
stopped: `quotes`, `bookings` and `reviews` had tables and state machines and
nothing that wrote a row, the entry deck's right swipe was wired to an empty
handler, and every address resolved to the city centre.

Jobs tab and chat
- message router: thread, send, markRead, unreadTotal. A thread is a MATCH, not
  a job — one job with three interested pros is three private conversations.
- Current/Past segments derived from ACTIVE_JOB_STATUSES, job detail listing the
  pros who accepted, and the conversation itself with attachments.

Hiring from the deck
- A right swipe on the entry deck opened nothing. It now resolves "which job?"
  through a sheet — sign in, pick an open job, or post one — and calls the same
  deck.swipe the per-job deck does, so the open-request cap and row lock apply
  exactly once. Swipes are vetoable so closing the sheet returns the card.

Geocoding
- ST_Distance and ST_DWithin rank and filter every deck, and both operands were
  placeholders. Addresses now resolve through Mapbox (permanent=true, which is
  what licenses storing the coordinates), the server resolves points rather than
  trusting client-supplied lat/lng, and every stored point records how it was
  obtained. A `city`-precision base cannot reach the verification queue.

Quote -> booking -> review
- The commercial chain, minus payments. Accepting a quote is the only place a
  booking is created; confirming completion is what unlocks reviews and moves
  the pro's completed_jobs.
- Reviews publish double-blind with no sweeper: each is written with
  published_at already set to its embargo deadline and every read filters
  published_at <= now(), so it publishes itself. The second review pulls both
  forward. A silent counterparty cannot bury a bad review by never replying.

State machine changes, both deliberate
- booked -> matched: a cancelled booking is not a cancelled job.
- scheduled -> awaiting_confirmation: in_progress is optional, so a pro who
  never tapped Start can still say the work is done.

Test suite
- api tests ran files in parallel against one database and failed roughly one
  run in three on whichever file lost the race. Serialised, and three fixtures
  that grabbed "the first client" pinned to the seeded accounts.

Also includes work from a parallel session: admin verification queue, pro
public profile and reviews read path, notification sending, denormalised stats
recompute, search, and observability.

318 tests passing; typecheck and lint clean across 7 packages.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-08-21 06:29:59 -04:00

serfowiandClaude Opus 5

cebeda7f4c

M1: authentication with better-auth, verified end to end

Switches from the planned Auth.js v5 to better-auth 1.7.1. The plan
assumed the blocker would be schema fit; it is not. @auth/drizzle-adapter
accepts our tables verbatim. What rules Auth.js out is that credentials
providers hardcode JWT and never call adapter.createSession, and the
config assertion that would catch it only fires when EVERY provider is
credentials — so adding Google suppresses the warning and the app ships
silently broken. Phone OTP with database sessions is not reachable there
without hand-building the whole OTP security layer.

Also corrects a premise: better-auth's drizzle-orm peer is declared
OPTIONAL, so no 0.38 -> 0.45 upgrade is forced. Verified on 0.38.4.

- auth schema rewritten to better-auth 1.7.1's own getSchema() output:
  sessions/accounts/verifications reshaped, emailVerified and
  phoneVerified are BOOLEAN (a timestamptz there fails 100% of signups),
  accounts.issuer added, phone_otps dropped. Ban state now comes from the
  admin plugin rather than a second bannedAt column.
- Session resolution is one file. Everything downstream is written
  against our own Session type, so the provider stays swappable.
- Ban enforcement lives in the resolver because Session carries no ban
  field and protectedProcedure promises a non-banned user.
- Phone OTP sign-in, Google, role selection, tRPC user router.
- Synthetic emails for phone-first users, with isSyntheticEmail() gating
  every future send. Pros must supply a real address; clients need not.
- Duplicate-account detection, since both signup routes stay open and
  nothing correlates a phone to a Google identity. Detects only — merging
  accounts that carry reviews and payments needs its own tooling.
- SMS sender refuses to fall back to console logging in production.
- declaration:false for the app, which is the actual fix for the TS2742
  wall from better-auth's transitive zod under pnpm.

Verified against a live server: OTP sent, code verified, uuid PK honoured,
database session written, and an authenticated tRPC call resolved. A
signed-in stranger gets NOT_FOUND on another client's deck; anonymous
gets UNAUTHORIZED.

124 tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-08-20 14:40:23 -04:00