6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
serfaandClaude Opus 5 0c49aa9502 Deck: five actions — rewind, watch and ask, either side of pass and send
The deck had two answers, which is a lot to hang on a swipe: send this pro a job
right now, or lose them. Three more, in one fixed row (DESIGN.md §6.8):

  rewind · ✗ · watch · ✓ · ask

Size is the hierarchy — the two that end the card stay 64px, the three that do
not are 44px, never below the §8 floor. Rewind is disabled rather than hidden
when there is nothing to undo, so the row never changes length and the big pair
never moves out from under a thumb.

Rewind is local. The entry deck writes no swipes — a `swipes` row is job-scoped
and there is no job there — so the card leaving was only ever an index move.

Watch: "tell me when this one is free"
- `pro_watches` snapshots the pro's availability AT WATCH TIME, because the
  trigger is a change, not a state. Without it a sweep would notify every
  watcher on every run, since "available" stays true for as long as they stay
  available.
- Deliberately the narrow version: a pro with is_accepting_jobs = false is
  invisible everywhere (eligibleProAtAnyDistance requires it), so a watch can
  only be placed on somebody already free and fires on the away-and-back cycle.
  "Free at a time that suits me" needs pro_availability — seeded since M1, read
  by nothing — to become a real calendar. Flagged rather than faked.

Ask: a question, before there is a job
- This is the first way to reach a pro who has not agreed to anything. Chat was
  gated behind message → match → accepted request → job, and that gate is what
  made a pro's inbox worth opening, so the cap is not decoration:
  MAX_OPEN_ENQUIRIES unanswered at a time, one thread per pair so it cannot be
  walked around, answered threads stop counting, stale ones fall out, and the
  pro can close one.
- `enquiries` is its own table, not a match with a null job: a match means a pro
  said yes to specific work, and collapsing the two would put rows in `matches`
  that no quote, booking or review could hang off.
- `messages` now belongs to a match OR an enquiry, with a CHECK making the
  illegal state unrepresentable. One message table, so one chat screen.

283 tests passing; typecheck and lint clean across 7 packages.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 06:49:17 -04:00
serfaandClaude Opus 5 974e312534 M2: the full job lifecycle — chat, hiring, geocoding, quotes, bookings, reviews
Closes the funnel. Before this the product could match two people and then
stopped: `quotes`, `bookings` and `reviews` had tables and state machines and
nothing that wrote a row, the entry deck's right swipe was wired to an empty
handler, and every address resolved to the city centre.

Jobs tab and chat
- message router: thread, send, markRead, unreadTotal. A thread is a MATCH, not
  a job — one job with three interested pros is three private conversations.
- Current/Past segments derived from ACTIVE_JOB_STATUSES, job detail listing the
  pros who accepted, and the conversation itself with attachments.

Hiring from the deck
- A right swipe on the entry deck opened nothing. It now resolves "which job?"
  through a sheet — sign in, pick an open job, or post one — and calls the same
  deck.swipe the per-job deck does, so the open-request cap and row lock apply
  exactly once. Swipes are vetoable so closing the sheet returns the card.

Geocoding
- ST_Distance and ST_DWithin rank and filter every deck, and both operands were
  placeholders. Addresses now resolve through Mapbox (permanent=true, which is
  what licenses storing the coordinates), the server resolves points rather than
  trusting client-supplied lat/lng, and every stored point records how it was
  obtained. A `city`-precision base cannot reach the verification queue.

Quote -> booking -> review
- The commercial chain, minus payments. Accepting a quote is the only place a
  booking is created; confirming completion is what unlocks reviews and moves
  the pro's completed_jobs.
- Reviews publish double-blind with no sweeper: each is written with
  published_at already set to its embargo deadline and every read filters
  published_at <= now(), so it publishes itself. The second review pulls both
  forward. A silent counterparty cannot bury a bad review by never replying.

State machine changes, both deliberate
- booked -> matched: a cancelled booking is not a cancelled job.
- scheduled -> awaiting_confirmation: in_progress is optional, so a pro who
  never tapped Start can still say the work is done.

Test suite
- api tests ran files in parallel against one database and failed roughly one
  run in three on whichever file lost the race. Serialised, and three fixtures
  that grabbed "the first client" pinned to the seeded accounts.

Also includes work from a parallel session: admin verification queue, pro
public profile and reviews read path, notification sending, denormalised stats
recompute, search, and observability.

318 tests passing; typecheck and lint clean across 7 packages.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 06:29:59 -04:00
serfowiandClaude Opus 5 176ba187c8 M1: phone app shell, settings, profile, dev login
Everything now renders inside a phone illustration on the entry screen,
with a five-tab bar. The frame lives in the root layout rather than one
page, so sign-in, onboarding and the job form are inside it too.

- Entry screen is the product running, not a marketing page: a live
  swipeable deck of real verified pros with a trade-filter strip above
  the card. deck.showcase is the only public procedure in that router
  and writes nothing, so an anonymous right swipe reaches no one.

- Settings: notification preferences (new table, defaults returned when
  no row exists), signed-in devices, GDPR export, deletion request.

  Closes the setEmail finding: an unverified address is no longer
  written to users.email, which is UNIQUE -- claiming a stranger's
  address used to block them from ever signing up with Google, and the
  uniqueness error leaked whether an address was registered. Now parked
  in email_change_requests until a token proves ownership.

- Profile: for a pro it leads with their REAL deck card, rendered by the
  same exported <Card> clients swipe, so the two cannot drift. Adds
  pro.previewCard (works at draft/pending, where publicProfile 404s) and
  pro.reorderMedia (photo position 0 is the deck card). Warns before an
  edit that would send a verified pro back for review, rather than after
  it silently drops them off the deck. Clients get a thin profile plus a
  route into pro onboarding -- supply is the launch blocker.

- Dev login: +34600000000 / 000000, behind THREE guards (NODE_ENV,
  an explicit ALLOW_DEV_LOGIN flag, and an exact number match). It
  overwrites the stored code rather than skipping verification, so the
  real expiry, attempt cap and single-use consumption still apply.

- Seed uses portrait photos. The cards previously showed picsum stock
  scenery -- a locksmith standing on a railway track.

Fixes found along the way: the card's name rendered ink-950 navy on a
dark photo because globals.css sets h1..h6 colour in @layer base, which
beat the inherited text-white; and the card referenced --color-go-500,
--border and --card, none of which exist, so the SEND JOB stamp had no
colour.

Also adds public/sw.js as a kill-switch: a service worker left
registered on localhost:3000 by a different project was intercepting
this app's chunks.

typecheck, lint clean; 186 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 03:16:27 -04:00
serfowiandClaude Opus 5 c617bc9687 M1 security: close the password backdoor, apply re-review, pin E.164
Acts on an adversarial review of the M1 auth and authorization code.
Five findings fixed; the rest recorded in SECURITY-FINDINGS.md as the
M1 exit criteria rather than left in a tool transcript.

- auth: serve /phone-number/request-password-reset, /phone-number/
  reset-password and /sign-in/phone-number as 404. better-auth's
  phoneNumber() registers all three unconditionally -- they are NOT
  gated on emailAndPassword.enabled:false. Left live they form a
  silent second credential path: request-password-reset stores an OTP
  and sends no SMS (sendPasswordResetOTP was never configured, so the
  owner is never told), reset-password mints a bcrypt credential row,
  and sign-in/phone-number then accepts it forever with no OTP. The
  OTP gate still applies, so this is not remote unauthenticated
  takeover -- it converts one momentary OTP compromise into permanent
  access the victim cannot see or rotate.

- auth: drop bearer(). It accepts the plaintext sessions.token column
  as an Authorization credential, making any single leaked row a
  replayable login. The mobile client it was added for is hypothetical.

- auth: pin E.164 via phoneNumberValidator, and add toE164/isE164 to
  @linkder/shared. phone is UNIQUE and bans are per-account, so
  "+34600111222" and "0034600111222" being separately storable meant
  one handset could hold two accounts and a ban was escapable by
  retyping. 15 tests.

- auth: NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL now throws in production instead of
  falling back to localhost, which was silently dropping Secure and
  the __Secure- prefix from the production session cookie.

- pro.upsertProfile: actually apply requiresReReview. It was computed,
  returned to the client and never acted on, so a verified plumber
  could become a verified electrician in another city by ignoring a
  response flag. Now demotes to pending in the same transaction and
  audits it. Trade changes count as material (they did not before) --
  the licence is per-trade. Needed a verified -> pending edge in
  VERIFICATION_GRAPH, which did not exist.

Removed two untracked scratch repro files. The impersonation repro
depended on bearer() for transport and no longer applies as written;
the underlying finding (resolveSession drops impersonatedBy, so admin
actions are audited as the victim) is open and documented.

typecheck, lint, build clean; 127 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 01:19:32 -04:00
serfowiandClaude Opus 5 cebeda7f4c M1: authentication with better-auth, verified end to end
Switches from the planned Auth.js v5 to better-auth 1.7.1. The plan
assumed the blocker would be schema fit; it is not. @auth/drizzle-adapter
accepts our tables verbatim. What rules Auth.js out is that credentials
providers hardcode JWT and never call adapter.createSession, and the
config assertion that would catch it only fires when EVERY provider is
credentials — so adding Google suppresses the warning and the app ships
silently broken. Phone OTP with database sessions is not reachable there
without hand-building the whole OTP security layer.

Also corrects a premise: better-auth's drizzle-orm peer is declared
OPTIONAL, so no 0.38 -> 0.45 upgrade is forced. Verified on 0.38.4.

- auth schema rewritten to better-auth 1.7.1's own getSchema() output:
  sessions/accounts/verifications reshaped, emailVerified and
  phoneVerified are BOOLEAN (a timestamptz there fails 100% of signups),
  accounts.issuer added, phone_otps dropped. Ban state now comes from the
  admin plugin rather than a second bannedAt column.
- Session resolution is one file. Everything downstream is written
  against our own Session type, so the provider stays swappable.
- Ban enforcement lives in the resolver because Session carries no ban
  field and protectedProcedure promises a non-banned user.
- Phone OTP sign-in, Google, role selection, tRPC user router.
- Synthetic emails for phone-first users, with isSyntheticEmail() gating
  every future send. Pros must supply a real address; clients need not.
- Duplicate-account detection, since both signup routes stay open and
  nothing correlates a phone to a Google identity. Detects only — merging
  accounts that carry reviews and payments needs its own tooling.
- SMS sender refuses to fall back to console logging in production.
- declaration:false for the app, which is the actual fix for the TS2742
  wall from better-auth's transitive zod under pnpm.

Verified against a live server: OTP sent, code verified, uuid PK honoured,
database session written, and an authenticated tRPC call resolved. A
signed-in stranger gets NOT_FOUND on another client's deck; anonymous
gets UNAUTHORIZED.

124 tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 14:40:23 -04:00
serfowiandClaude Opus 5 19623bcccb M0: foundation — monorepo, PostGIS schema, deck query, app shell
Greenfield scaffold for Linkder, a swipe-to-hire marketplace for local
professional services.

- pnpm/turbo monorepo: apps/web, packages/{shared,db}
- Postgres 16 + PostGIS via docker compose (ports 5442/6389 to avoid
  clashing with other local stacks)
- Drizzle schema, 23 tables, geography(Point,4326) with GiST indexes
- Domain core in packages/shared: integer-cent money, status transition
  graphs, deck ranking weights, cancellation policy — 46 unit tests
- Deck query: filtering in Postgres on the GiST index, ranking in JS so
  the weights stay tunable — 18 integration tests against a seeded DB
- Deterministic seed placing pros at known distances, including three
  that must NOT appear on a deck (out of radius, unverified, away)
- Next.js 15 app shell with a working swipe deck
- CI: typecheck, lint, test, build against live postgres+redis

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 13:32:35 -04:00